{"id":1744,"date":"2014-10-21T19:55:14","date_gmt":"2014-10-21T19:55:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=1744"},"modified":"2014-10-21T19:55:14","modified_gmt":"2014-10-21T19:55:14","slug":"how-to-make-the-house-of-representatives-representative","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/how-to-make-the-house-of-representatives-representative\/","title":{"rendered":"How to make the House of Representatives representative"},"content":{"rendered":"

By Michel Balinski<\/a>, Ecole Polytechnique<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Foundation essay<\/strong>: This article is part of a series marking the launch of The Conversation in the US. Our foundation essays are longer than our usual comment and analysis articles and take a wider look at key issues affecting society.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u201cIn Republics,\u201d James Madison warned in the Federal Papers<\/a>, \u201cthe great danger is that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority\u201d: in today\u2019s America that fear is inverted.<\/p>\n

On November 4 there is a better than even chance that a minority of voters will once again elect a majority of the representatives in the House. This will be a repeat of what happened two years ago. Then, the Democratic candidates together garnered 59,214,910<\/a> votes nation-wide to the Republican\u2019s total of 57,622,827 and yet the Republicans won 234 house seats to the Democrats’ 201<\/a> despite having 1,592,083 fewer votes.<\/p>\n

Why does this happen? Because of gerrymandering or \u201cthe practice,\u201d as Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines it, \u201cof dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition\u2019s voting strength.\u201d<\/p>\n

Practiced as a political artform for some two centuries, gerrymandering is now an exact science. Computer programs using vast data banks describing sociological, ethnic, economic, religious and political characteristics of the electorate determine districts \u2013 often of incredibly weird contours \u2013 that favor the party that drew the maps.<\/p>\n

Texas after the census of 2000 is an excellent example. Every one of its 32 districts had populations of 651,619 or 651,620. The numbers were absolutely perfect, and yet the districts were blatantly in favor of the Republicans, helping them gain six more seats. But as a brief of the American Civil Liberties Union states<\/a>: \u201cRepublicans are only doing unto Democrats as Democrats have done to them,\u201d giving as evidence Georgia\u2019s state senatorial districts in 2002 that gave Republicans 45% of the seats for 55% of the votes. It was this 2002 redistricting that provoked a Republican leader to say \u201cDemocrats rewrote the book when they did Georgia, and we would be stupid not to reciprocate.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"
Even in 1812 they were poking fun at gerrymandering.<\/span>
\n Elkanah Tisdale<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/p>\n

Gerrymandering vs the popular will<\/h2>\n

The ideal of \u201cone person, one vote\u201d is that every vote should have equal weight. Yet serious disparities in representation have persisted from the first days of the Republic to the Supreme Court\u2019s 1962 decision in Baker v Carr,<\/a> described by Chief Justice Earl Warren in his memoirs as \u201cthe most important case of [my] tenure on the Court.\u201d Baker v Carr overruled Justice Felix Frankfurter\u2019s injunction<\/a> that \u201cCourts ought not to enter this political thicket\u201d of redistricting. It asserted that an inequity in representation is a \u201cjusticiable constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision.\u201d There ensued a veritable flood of judicial appeals claiming unfair political districts at the federal, state and local levels.<\/p>\n

Since then the Supreme Court has heard all imaginable arguments, and its justices have expressed wildly different opinions. This is not surprising for there is no clear theoretical or practical definition of what constitutes an equitable districting plan. Confronted by two plans there are no principles with which to decide that one is more equitable than the other. Only one clear-cut criterion (as spelled out in the 1969 Kirkpatrick v Preisler<\/a> case) has survived: \u201cSince \u2018equal representation for equal numbers of people [is] the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives,\u2019 the \u2018as nearly as practicable\u2019 standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality.\u201d<\/p>\n

Today\u2019s congressional districts and the 2012 election prove this does not suffice, as Justice John Harlan foresaw<\/a> in 1969: \u201cThe fact of the matter is that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with \u2018gerrymandering\u2019 of the worst sort. A computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular will..\u201d<\/p>\n

In 2012, for example, Ohio elected 12 Republicans and four Democrats. But Democrat candidates together polled 2,412,385 votes to the Republicans\u2019 2,620,233. Based on the votes their fair shares of 16 seats are 7.67 for the Democrats and 8.33 for the Republicans, so each should elect eight candidates.<\/p>\n

Even more shocking, Michigan elected five Democrats and nine Republicans but the Democratic candidates’ total vote of 2,327,985 outpolled the Republican candidates\u2019 2,086,985. This is why Justice Harlan went on to call for a new method of election: \u201cThe legislature \u2026 must create a structure which in fact as well as theory be responsive to the sentiments of the community.\u201d<\/p>\n

A solution: Fair Majority Voting<\/h2>\n

Fair Majority Voting (FMV)<\/a> is a structure that does the job. It is based on the fundamental fact that each member of the House represents a district, a state and a party. To explain it, take the 2012 congressional vote in Kentucky\u2019s six districts. The elections returned one Democrat and five Republicans (their votes in bold):<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
2012 US House of Representatives election results, Kentucky.<\/span>
\n Clerk of the House of Representatives<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/p>\n

The Republicans\u2019 percentage of the total vote was 60.01% so of six total seats their fair share is 3.60: they deserved four seats. The Democrats\u2019 39.99% of the vote translates into 2.40 of six, so they deserved two seats. Which four Republicans and two Democrats should be elected? To decide FMV computes the percentage of the vote for each of the candidates in each district:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
2012 House of Representative election results, Kentucky, percentages.<\/span>
\n Clerk of the House of Representatives<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/p>\n

The candidates elected are the four Republicans with the highest percentages (in bold: 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th districts) and the two Democrats with the highest percentages (necessarily the other districts, in bold: 3rd and 6th). Thus FMV elects the number of candidates each party deserves. The method may be extended to any number of parties.<\/p>\n

FMV may, at first, shock \u2013 why deny the age-old habit and sometimes elect a candidate with a minority of the vote? Because the age-old habit ignores the fact that today\u2019s representatives in the House behave and vote in the interests of their party and their state every bit as much as in the interests of their districts. Moreover, FMV has very important advantages, among them:<\/p>\n