{"id":28530,"date":"2022-01-26T04:16:00","date_gmt":"2022-01-26T04:16:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=28530"},"modified":"2022-01-27T04:21:16","modified_gmt":"2022-01-27T04:21:16","slug":"russias-recent-invasions-of-ukraine-and-georgia-offer-clues-to-what-putin-might-be-thinking-now","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/russias-recent-invasions-of-ukraine-and-georgia-offer-clues-to-what-putin-might-be-thinking-now\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s recent invasions of Ukraine and Georgia offer clues to what Putin might be thinking now"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Liam Collins<\/a>, United States Military Academy West Point<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given that Russia has amassed 100,000 troops<\/a> along its nearly 1,200-mile border with Ukraine, a look at two recent invasions by Russia against neighboring territories offers insight to what a possible new invasion would entail if diplomacy is unable to ease the growing tensions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Invasion of Georgia<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia, a country in the Caucasus region located on the Black Sea, during the opening ceremony<\/a> of the Beijing Olympics. Approximately 40,000 soldiers<\/a> and 1,200 armored vehicles entered into Georgia\u2019s semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia before stopping about 35 miles<\/a> short of Tbilisi, Georgia\u2019s capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin attempted to justify the invasion under the pretense of the international norm of the responsibility to protect<\/a>. In this case, Russia argued that its use of force was required to protect Osseitians from Georgian \u201cgenocide\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect<\/a>, a nongovernmental international agency started in 2008 to prevent genocide, found no legal justification for Russia\u2019s use of force. Instead, there is plenty of evidence<\/a> to indicate the war was \u201cpremeditated.\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Russian
In this Feb. 28, 2014, photograph, Russian armored personnel carriers are rolling into Crimea, Ukraine. Bulent Doruk\/Anadolu Agency\/Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Invasion of Crimea<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In 2014, when Russian invaded Crimea, Putin had a large troop formation along Ukraine\u2019s border<\/a>. But instead of invading there, Putin used hybrid warfare<\/a> to seize Crimea, a peninsula that juts into the Black Sea and housed a Russian naval base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine failed to provide a military response. But when Russia actively supported separatists in the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk \u2013 collectively known as the Donbass \u2013 Ukraine fought back. Even though Ukraine\u2019s military was in a \u201cdecrepit\u201d state<\/a>, hollowed out by decades of corruption<\/a>, it was able to push the Russian-backed separatists to the border with the help of volunteers<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response, Russia increased its support, sending small military formations<\/a> to assist the separatists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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