{"id":33871,"date":"2023-05-16T04:15:00","date_gmt":"2023-05-16T04:15:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=33871"},"modified":"2023-05-17T04:19:41","modified_gmt":"2023-05-17T04:19:41","slug":"sunzi-shi-and-strategy-how-to-read-art-of-war-the-way-its-author-intended","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/sunzi-shi-and-strategy-how-to-read-art-of-war-the-way-its-author-intended\/","title":{"rendered":"Sunzi, \u2018sh\u00ec\u2019 and strategy: How to read \u2018Art of War\u2019 the way its author\u00a0intended"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Scott D. McDonald<\/a>, Tufts University<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the mid-1990s, I picked up the military classic \u201cArt of War<\/a>\u201d hoping to find insight into my new career as an officer in the United States Marine Corps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I was not the only one looking for insights from the sage Sunzi, also known as Sun Tzu, who died over 2,500 years ago. \u201cArt of War\u201d has long been mined for an understanding of China\u2019s strategic tradition and universal military truths. The book\u2019s maxims, such as \u201cknow the enemy and know yourself,\u201d are routinely quoted in military texts, as well as business<\/a> and management<\/a> books.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initially, I was disappointed. It seemed Sunzi\u2019s advice was either common sense or in agreement with Western military classics. However, a few years later the Marine Corps trained me as a China scholar, and I spent much of my career working on U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific<\/a> region. This deepened my desire to understand how leaders in the People\u2019s Republic of China see the world and choose strategies. Looking for insight, I turned to classical Chinese philosophy and finally encountered concepts that helped illuminate the unique perspective of Sunzi\u2019s \u201cArt of War.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, I am an academic researching how Chinese philosophy and foreign policy intersect<\/a>. To comprehend \u201cArt of War,\u201d it helps readers to approach the text from the worldview of its author. That means reading Sunzi\u2019s advice through the prism of classical Chinese metaphysics<\/a>, which is deeply shaped by the philosophy of Daoism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Daoist roots<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s intellectual tradition is rooted in the Warring States period<\/a> from the 5th to 3rd century B.C.E., the era during which Sunzi is thought to have lived. Though a time of conflict, it was also a time of cultural and intellectual development that led to the rise of Daoism and Confucianism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"A<\/a>
Sunzi\u2019s writing has had a significant impact on both Chinese and foreign politics. Pictures From History\/Universal Images Group via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Confucian philosophy focuses on maintaining proper social relationships as the key to moral behavior and and social harmony. Daoism, on the other hand, is more concerned with metaphysics: trying to understand the workings of the natural world and drawing analogies about how humans should act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Daoism views existence as composed of constant cycles of change<\/a>, in which power ebbs and flows. Meanwhile, the \u201cD\u00e0o,\u201d or \u201cthe way,\u201d directs all things in nature toward fulfilling their inherent potential, like water flowing downhill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Helping nature take its course<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Chinese word for this concept of \u201csituational potential<\/a>\u201d is \u52e2, or \u201csh\u00ec\u201d \u2013 the name of Chapter Five in \u201cArt of War.\u201d Almost every Western version translates it differently, but it is key to the military concepts Sunzi employs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, Chapter Five<\/a> explains how those who are \u201cexpert at war\u201d are not overly concerned with individual soldiers. Instead, effective leaders are able to determine the potential in the situation and put themselves in position to take advantage of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is why later chapters spend so much time discussing geography and deployment of forces, rather than fighting techniques. One does more to damage an opponent\u2019s potential by undermining their scheme<\/a> than by merely killing their soldiers. Sunzi is concerned about long supply lines<\/a>, because they lower an army\u2019s potential by making it harder to move and vulnerable to disruption. A general who understands potential can evaluate troops, terrain and scheme, then arrange the battlefield to \u201csubdue the enemy without fighting<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"A<\/a>
Painting of a battle between Chinese and Vietnamese forces during the Qing invasion of Vietnam in 1788. Pictures From History\/Universal Images Group via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In Daoist thought<\/a>, the correct way to manage each situation\u2019s potential is to act with \u7121\u70ba, \u201cw\u00faw\u00e9i,\u201d which literally translates as \u201cnonaction.\u201d However, the key idea is to disturb the natural order as little as possible<\/a>, taking the minimum action needed to allow the situation\u2019s potential to be fulfilled. The term does not appear in \u201cArt of War,\u201d but a contemporary reader of Sunzi\u2019s would have been familiar with the connection between nurturing \u201csh\u00ec\u201d and acting with \u201cw\u00faw\u00e9i.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The importance of acting with \u201cw\u00faw\u00e9i\u201d is illustrated by the Confucian philosopher Mengzi\u2019s<\/a> story about a farmer who pulled on his corn stalks<\/a> in an attempt to help them grow tall, but killed the crop instead. One does not help corn grow by forcing it but by understanding its natural potential and acting accordingly: ensuring the soil is good, weeds are removed and water is sufficient. Actions are most effective when they nurture potential, not when they try to force it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the battlefield to the UN<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In a Daoist understanding, leaders hoping to chart an effective strategy must read the situation, discover its potential, and position their armies or states in the best position to take advantage of \u201csh\u00ec.\u201d They act with \u201cw\u00faw\u00e9i\u201d to nurture situations, rather than force, which could disturb the situation and cause chaos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, in foreign policy, a decision-maker should attempt to make small policy adjustments as early as possible to slowly manage the development of the international environment. This approach is evident in Beijing\u2019s use of \u201cgu\u0101nx\u00ec.\u201d Meaning \u201crelationships,\u201d the Chinese term carries a strong sense of mutual obligation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, the PRC waged a decadeslong effort to take over the United Nations \u201cChina seat\u201d from Taiwan<\/a>, where the Republic of China government had fled after Communists\u2019 victory in the civil war. Beijing accomplished that by slowly building friendships, identifying shared strategic interests and accruing owed favors with many small states around the world, until in 1971 it had enough votes in the General Assembly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trend-watching today<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The concept of \u201csh\u00ec\u201d also provides a lens for understanding the PRC\u2019s increasing pressure on Taiwan<\/a>, a self-ruled island that Beijing claims is its own territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"A<\/a>
A Taiwanese tank used in previous conflicts and on display for tourists in Kinmen, Taiwan, is seen silhouetted against the skyline of the mainland city of Xiamen. Chris McGrath\/Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Sunzi might say that discerning the current trend in the Taiwan Strait is more essential than conventional questions about comparative military strength. Several factors could push Taiwan closer to Beijing, including the island\u2019s loss of diplomatic allies<\/a> and the pull of the PRC\u2019s massive economy<\/a> \u2013 not to mention Beijing\u2019s growing global clout<\/a> vis-\u00e0-vis the U.S. If so, sh\u00ec is in Beijing\u2019s favor, and a nudge to persuade the U.S. to stay out is all that is needed to keep the situation developing to the PRC\u2019s advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Or is the potential developing in the other direction? Such factors as a growing sense of a unique Taiwanese identity<\/a> and the PRC\u2019s troubled economic model<\/a> may make closer ties with the mainland less and less appealing in Taiwan. In that case, Beijing may see a need to appear strong and dominant so Taiwan will not be lulled into counting on support from Washington, D.C.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A surface reading of Sunzi can easily support an emphasis on troop deployments, intelligence and logistics. However, an understanding of \u201csh\u00ec\u201d highlights Sunzi\u2019s emphasis on evaluating and nurturing situational potential. It is not that the former are unimportant, but a decision-maker will use them differently if the goal is to manage situational trends rather than seek decisive battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That \u201cArt of War\u201d continues to top sales lists<\/a> demonstrates its lasting appeal. However, to be useful as a guide to understanding security policy and strategy, my experience in the Indo-Pacific region suggests one must dig into the principles that shaped Sunzi\u2019s view of the world and continue to shape the view of leaders in Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scott D. McDonald<\/a>, Non-resident Fellow, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; PhD Candidate, The Fletcher School, Tufts University<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Scott D. McDonald, Tufts University In the mid-1990s, I picked up the military classic \u201cArt of War\u201d hoping to find insight into my new career as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. I was not the only one looking for insights from the sage Sunzi, also known as Sun Tzu, who died over […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":33872,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[8025,2450],"tags":[14051,14048,145,14049,14050,4334,196,1125,581,364,6610,6254],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33871"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33871"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33871\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33873,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33871\/revisions\/33873"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/33872"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33871"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33871"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33871"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}