{"id":37575,"date":"2024-08-11T13:45:00","date_gmt":"2024-08-11T13:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=37575"},"modified":"2024-09-26T21:45:25","modified_gmt":"2024-09-26T21:45:25","slug":"wagner-group-setback-in-mali-challenges-moscows-strategy-in-africa-and-the-regions-faith-in-russian-mercenaries","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wagner-group-setback-in-mali-challenges-moscows-strategy-in-africa-and-the-regions-faith-in-russian-mercenaries\/","title":{"rendered":"Wagner Group setback in Mali challenges Moscow\u2019s strategy in Africa and the region\u2019s faith in Russian&nbsp;mercenaries"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/christopher-michael-faulkner-667077\">Christopher Michael Faulkner<\/a>, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/us-naval-war-college-1382\">US Naval War College<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While Russia\u2019s army is <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/failure-or-feint-taking-stock-of-russias-bogged-down-move-on-kharkiv-2\/\">bogged down in Ukraine<\/a>, its mercenaries are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/wagner-s-mali-fiasco-exposes-discord-among-russian-military-bloggers-\/7726994.html\">faring no better in Africa<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In late July 2024, mercenaries from the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-68322230\">the Wagner Group, a Moscow-aligned private military company<\/a>, accompanied the Malian army in what the Malian regime called a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/MaliTransition\/status\/1817960673743396958\">stabilization operation<\/a>\u201d in the West African country\u2019s northeastern town of Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That mission quickly <a href=\"https:\/\/alleyesonwagner.org\/2024\/08\/03\/disarray-in-azawad\/\">went sideways<\/a> when fighting broke out between that coalition and rebels from the Permanent Strategic Framework, an ethnically Tuareg separatist group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In retreat, Wagner and Malian forces were ambushed by militants from the al-Qaida affiliate <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dni.gov\/nctc\/ftos\/jnim_fto.html\">Jama&#8217;at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin<\/a>, or JNIM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Upward of 80 Wagner personnel and over 40 Malian soldiers were <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/mali-says-cutting-ties-with-ukraine-over-alleged-involvement-rebel-attack-2024-08-04\/\">reportedly killed in the fighting<\/a>. Among the casualties was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/russian\/articles\/cne4n0nvweeo\">Nikita Fedyanin<\/a>, who ran Wagner\u2019s popular <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/grey_zone\/18064\">Telegram channel The Grey Zone<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/tweetsintheME\/status\/1819052390751899778\">Tuareg rebels<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/SimNasr\/status\/1817310074114822387\">JNIM<\/a> were quick to celebrate their success, Mali and Wagner <a href=\"https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/malian-army-downplays-losses-after-battle-with-tuaregs-jnim\/7726410.html\">sought to downplay<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cq5xvl1111yo\">their losses<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And understandably so. The defeat in Tinzaouaten puts both the Wagner Group and Russia in a bind. It signal to African leaders the limits of having <a href=\"https:\/\/ctc.westpoint.edu\/after-prigozhin-the-future-of-the-wagner-model-in-africa\/\">Moscow-backed mercenaries as a counterterrorism partner<\/a> and regime protector, especially in a complex security environment such as Mali\u2019s. But it also challenges Moscow\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/russias-growing-footprint-africa\">strategy on the continent<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/newshour\/world\/russia-officially-confirms-wagner-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-died-in-plane-crash#:%7E:text=MOSCOW%20(AP)%20%E2%80%94%20Russian%20authorities,Wednesday%2C%20killing%20everyone%20on%20board.\">death of Wagner\u2019s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin<\/a>, in August 2023, Moscow has tried to take over the group\u2019s operations by establishing the <a href=\"https:\/\/issafrica.org\/iss-today\/russias-africa-corps-more-than-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle\">Africa Corps<\/a>, a Ministry of Defense-controlled project designed to resemble Wagner. That project aims to bring Wagner fighters <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2024\/02\/12\/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html\">directly under the command and control<\/a> of the Russian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But this has proven more challenging than Moscow anticipated and has complicated Russia\u2019s plans to expand its partnerships across Africa via the offer of support from private military companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Wagner\u2019s questionable reliability<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The Tinzaouaten incident was a major blow to Wagner, representing its largest known loss of life in Africa. For context, over its nearly decadelong <a href=\"https:\/\/www.institutmontaigne.org\/en\/expressions\/operation-barkhane-success-failure-mixed-bag\">counterterrorism mission<\/a> based in Mali, the French lost <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/08\/15\/world\/africa\/mali-france-military-operation.html\">59 soldiers<\/a>. France\u2019s approach to counterterrorism in Mali helped sow the seeds of military discontent that led to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/africa\/sahel\/mali\/mali-un-coup-dans-le-coup\">multiple coups between 2020 and 2021<\/a>. It also laid the groundwork for Mali\u2019s coup leaders to turn to Wagner rather than Paris for its security needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed is-type-wp-embed is-provider-datawrapper wp-block-embed-datawrapper\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe class=\"wp-embedded-content\" sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" title=\"Where is Mali?\" src=\"https:\/\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/kMowD\/1\/#?secret=OBFZVqZIoB\" data-secret=\"OBFZVqZIoB\" scrolling=\"no\" frameborder=\"0\" height=\"549\"><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Since entering Mali in December 2021 \u2013 and especially after the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2023\/08\/27\/1196219007\/russia-confirmed-yevgeny-prigozhin-died-in-plane-crash\">death of Prigozhin<\/a> \u2013 Wagner forces have been able to claim some successes. In November, Russian mercenaries helped the Malian army <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-67418482\">retake the city of Kidal<\/a>, a separatist stronghold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That success may have led to overconfidence; as the Tinzaouaten incident shows, there are very real security challenges across Mali, and Wagner\u2019s tactics, including <a href=\"https:\/\/acleddata.com\/2022\/08\/30\/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali\/\">indiscriminate violence and targeting civilians<\/a>, are far from the most effective tools for addressing Mali\u2019s security crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Though the Tinzaouten incident was Wagner\u2019s largest known loss in Africa, it is not its first. Back in 2019, Wagner forces infamously overpromised and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.geopoliticalmonitor.com\/russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa\/\">underdelivered<\/a> in a short-lived counterterrorism campaign in Mozambique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In that case, Wagner lasted just a few months before withdrawing after it became apparent it was ill-equipped, underprepared and too dismissive of local Mozambican military partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Though the recent events in Mali are not analogous with that, Wagner\u2019s abandonment of Mozambique may weigh on the minds of Mali\u2019s junta leaders following the group\u2019s latest setback.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Questions abound about whether Wagner or its successor, the Africa Corps, will remain invested in Malian security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There is also the potential for <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/mixed-picture-how-mali-views-wagner-group\">increasing tension<\/a> between the Malian army and its Russian partners over the security mission and who is calling the shots. In addition to <a href=\"https:\/\/mg.co.za\/africa\/2024-08-05-russian-fighters-killed-in-major-mali-battle-highlight-kremlins-diplomatic-and-security-strategy-in-africa\/\">testing that relationship<\/a> now, it could also lead to friction and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fpri.org\/article\/2024\/05\/africa-russian-pmcs\/\">other problems down the road<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Moscow\u2019s maneuvering<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Russia has tried to assuage concerns in the aftermath of the Tinzaouaten attack. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov contacted his Malian counterpart to <a href=\"https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/news\/1964536\/\">reaffirm Russia\u2019s commitment<\/a> to the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But talk is cheap. Whether the Kremlin plans to replenish Wagner\u2019s losses by deploying more personnel remains an open question. More importantly, the problems plaguing Mali can\u2019t be solved at the barrel of a gun, and both Moscow\u2019s and Mali\u2019s current regimes have proven themselves disinterested in nonmilitary solutions \u2013 such as negotiating with nonstate actors \u2013 to real or perceived security threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/612736\/original\/file-20240809-17-geabkv.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" alt=\"A group of men in army fatigues stand outside a building.\" \/><figcaption>Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani, the head of Niger\u2019s military government, joins Malian Col. Assimi Goita and Burkina Faso\u2019s Capt. Ibrahim Traore at the Confederation of Sahel States. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/the-head-of-head-of-nigers-military-government-general-news-photo\/2160365985?adppopup=true\">AFP via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>And Russia\u2019s engagement in Mali is far from altruistic. Mali is Africa\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/business\/malis-gold-reserves-climb-to-8817-tonnes-mines-ministry-official-idUSL8N32L23J\/\">fourth-largest producer<\/a> of gold. Like Wagner, Moscow wants a piece of that market. In November 2023, Russia <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/markets\/commodities\/mali-signs-agreement-with-russia-build-gold-refinery-2023-11-22\/\">signed an agreement<\/a> with Mali to construct the country\u2019s largest gold refinery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the surface, it looks like this could be an economic boost for Mali, but the project\u2019s timeline is unclear. The effort also has neocolonialist undertones, despite <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2023\/02\/08\/russia-ukraine-colonialism-diplomacy-africa\/\">Russia\u2019s rhetoric to the contrary<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There is, however, a scenario in which Wagner benefits from the latest setback. As <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/JohnLechner1\/status\/1817346033862504705\">several<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/responsiblestatecraft.org\/wagner-group-mali\/\">security experts<\/a> of Africa\u2019s Sahel region have noted, the losses may actually help bolster Wagner\u2019s reputation with Mali\u2019s military chiefs and the Malian population in general; a willingness to fight and die alongside partners is a strong signal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For states like Mali that have long been wary of foreign intervention, Wagner\u2019s willingness to get in the fight and take on missions that the French and Western security partners were unwilling to execute has resonated with parts of the population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Unanticipated consequences<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The setback for Wagner in Mali may benefit Moscow in another unexpected way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Days after the incident, a spokesperson for Ukraine\u2019s military intelligence insinuated that Ukraine may have played a role <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/mali-says-cutting-ties-with-ukraine-over-alleged-involvement-rebel-attack-2024-08-04\/#:%7E:text=%22The%20rebels%20received%20all%20the,the%20future%2C%22%20he%20said.\">in providing intelligence to Tuareg groups<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That messaging \u2013 whether posturing or true \u2013 led Mali to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2024\/08\/05\/ukraine-mali-wagner-mercenaries-russia\/\">cut diplomatic ties<\/a> with Ukraine. Neighboring Niger <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/niger-cuts-ties-with-ukraine-over-comments-mali-wagner-attack-2024-08-06\/\">quickly followed suit<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ukraine has since <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/ukraine-denies-involvement-mali-attack-says-cutting-ties-short-sighted-2024-08-05\/\">vehemently denied<\/a> involvement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Regardless, this dynamic illustrates the spillover in competition between Moscow and Kyiv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Ukraine stands to benefit from Wagner\u2019s failures in Africa, forcing Wagner clients to consider the value of their partnerships with Moscow. But as Mali\u2019s reaction suggests, such efforts can clearly backfire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Russia\u2019s implausible deniability<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Even so, for Russia, Wagner\u2019s losses create more challenges than opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moscow may be on the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lawfaremedia.org\/article\/the-wagner-group-lives-on-in-africa\">hook for Wagner\u2019s failures in Africa<\/a>, especially as it seeks to supplant Wagner with the <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/02\/07\/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso\/\">Africa Corps<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Events like those that unfolded in late July can no longer be easily explained away by the Kremlin. As <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/JohnLechner1\/status\/1817344338268913990\">John Lechner<\/a>, an expert on Wagner and Russian security, noted, Moscow has allowed the Wagner brand to live on in Mali, in part to give Russia cover for these types of security failures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>How long Moscow can continue that pageantry \u2013 denying that Wagner\u2019s failures are Russia\u2019s failures too, particularly with Mali\u2019s government \u2013 is up for debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite the clear value that Mali\u2019s junta saw in a contracting with Wagner, at some point the mission will need to scale up or events like those in Tinzaouaten could become more common. This is especially likely if the Malian army seeks to continue to expand the counterinsurgency mission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moscow surely doesn\u2019t want to jeopardize its relationship with Mali\u2019s coup leaders in the capital, Bamako. But it is also walking a delicate balance, wary of empowering the remnants of Wagner in any meaningful way that might lead the group to act out against Moscow\u2019s interests in Africa and elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moreover, grand ambitions to recruit tens of thousands of Africa Corps personnel have <a href=\"https:\/\/static.rusi.org\/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf\">reportedly fallen woefully short<\/a>, limiting Moscow\u2019s options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So while the Tinzaouaten incident offers a glimpse into Mali\u2019s very challenging security environment, it also highlights the limits of hitching your wagon to Russian mercenaries \u2013 be they under the banner of Wagner or reformed under Russia\u2019s Africa Corps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/christopher-michael-faulkner-667077\">Christopher Michael Faulkner<\/a>, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the College of Distance Education, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/us-naval-war-college-1382\">US Naval War College<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This article is republished from <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\">The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/wagner-group-setback-in-mali-challenges-moscows-strategy-in-africa-and-the-regions-faith-in-russian-mercenaries-236285\">original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Christopher Michael Faulkner, US Naval War College While Russia\u2019s army is bogged down in Ukraine, its mercenaries are faring no better in Africa. In late July 2024, mercenaries from the the Wagner Group, a Moscow-aligned private military company, accompanied the Malian army in what the Malian regime called a \u201cstabilization operation\u201d in the West African [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":56,"featured_media":37576,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[46,295,47,4],"tags":[885,891,886,860,15601,2937,234,14286],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37575"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/56"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37575"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37575\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37577,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37575\/revisions\/37577"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37576"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37575"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37575"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37575"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}