{"id":37729,"date":"2024-10-05T13:45:00","date_gmt":"2024-10-05T13:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=37729"},"modified":"2024-10-20T15:57:21","modified_gmt":"2024-10-20T15:57:21","slug":"irans-strike-on-israel-was-retaliatory-but-it-was-also-about-saving-face-and-restoring-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/irans-strike-on-israel-was-retaliatory-but-it-was-also-about-saving-face-and-restoring-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s strike on Israel was retaliatory \u2013 but it was also about saving face and restoring deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/aaron-pilkington-1364407\">Aaron Pilkington<\/a>, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-denver-812\">University of Denver<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/shadow-war-no-more-hostilities-between-israel-and-iran-have-strayed-into-direct-warfare-is-there-any-going-back-227877\">played out largely under the cover<\/a> of covert and clandestine operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The recent actions of both sides in this <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/shadow-war-no-more-hostilities-between-israel-and-iran-have-strayed-into-direct-warfare-is-there-any-going-back-227877\">once \u201cshadow war<\/a>\u201d have changed the nature of the conflict. It is not clear that de-escalation is on the horizon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On Oct 1, 2024, Iran launched a massive, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/live\/2024\/10\/01\/world\/israel-lebanon-hezbollah\">direct attack against Israel<\/a> notionally in retribution for Israel\u2019s dual assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah\u2019s chief, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It was the second such barrage in six months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/middleeast\/live-news\/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-04-14-24\/index.html\">many accounts<\/a>, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/iran-israel-air-conflict-one-week\">previous Iranian attack against Israel on April 13<\/a> \u2013 which consisted of over 300 ballistic and cruise missiles and attack drones \u2013 caused very little damage to Israel. Perhaps because of this, and likely in part due to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.axios.com\/2024\/04\/14\/biden-netanyahu-iran-israel-us-wont-support\">U.S. encouragement of restraint<\/a>, Israel\u2019s immediate military response then \u2013 an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/04\/20\/world\/middleeast\/israel-strikes-iran.html\">airstrike<\/a> against a single advanced Iranian air defense system in the Isfahan province \u2013 was somewhat measured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Many onlookers saw the calibrated exchange in April as a possible indication that both sides would <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/israel\/iran-and-israels-war-comes-out-shadows\">prefer to de-escalate<\/a> rather than engage in ongoing open warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But further Israeli military operations since then have prompted escalatory Iranian military responses, forcing the conflict back out of the shadows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With Hamas\u2019 capabilities and leadership degraded in the Gaza Strip, Israel\u2019s military leaders <a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/air-force-chief-says-idf-ready-for-war-in-north-as-hamas-nears-defeat\/\">announced in June that they were<\/a> \u201cready to face\u201d Hezbollah \u2013 the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group whose persistent rocket attacks against northern Israel have caused <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2024\/09\/23\/northern-israel-evacuees-hezbollah-war\/\">tens of thousands to evacuate<\/a> the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Israel pivots north<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel\u2019s pivot from Gaza toward Lebanon coincided with the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas\u2019 political bureau chairman, Haniyeh, during his stay in Tehran. The purported Israeli operation was seen as an <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/08\/05\/iran-israel-haniyeh-hamas-assassination-intelligence-failure-irgc-quds-khamenei\/\">affront to Iran\u2019s sovereignty. It was also an embarrassment<\/a> that highlighted the vulnerability and permeability of Iran\u2019s internal security apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Even though Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2024\/7\/31\/irans-khamenei-vows-harsh-punishment-for-israel-after-haniyeh-killing\">vowed a \u201charsh response\u201d<\/a> against Israel, by September Iran had taken no action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tehran\u2019s inaction <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newarab.com\/analysis\/will-iran-retaliate-against-israel-or-hold-back\">caused many Middle East analysts to question<\/a> if the Iranian response would ever materialize \u2013 and by extension, what that would mean for Khamenei\u2019s commitment to his proxy forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If indeed Iran\u2019s leadership opted for restraint following the assassination of Hamas\u2019 top political leader, the same could not be said for its reaction to Israel\u2019s multiphase operation against Hezbollah in mid-September.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel began with a clandestine operation to sow chaos and confusion in Hezbollah\u2019s command and control through the means of <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/lebanon-israel-exploding-pagers-hezbollah-syria-ce6af3c2e6de0a0dddfae48634278288\">sabotaged explosive communications devices<\/a>. Israel then carried out airstrikes eliminating <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/Israel\/status\/1839939956854132917?prefetchTimestamp=1727854257150\">Hezbollah\u2019s top leaders<\/a> including <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/video\/series\/news-explainers\/hezbollah-leader-hassan-nasrallah-killed-by-israeli-airstrike\/80E71F86-C82F-4023-A901-B5507F844F01?mod=djemwhatsnews\">Nasrallah<\/a>. The Israeli military then launched what the country\u2019s leaders describe as a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/idf-announces-launch-of-limited-ground-raids-of-hezbollah-sites-across-lebanon-border\/\">limited [ground] operation<\/a>\u201d into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tehran\u2019s Oct 1. attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.isna.ir\/news\/1403071008450\/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8\">Iranian military leaders<\/a>, primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These were certainly key factors. But as an <a href=\"https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?user=pF1ifjIAAAAJ&amp;hl=en\">expert on Iran\u2019s defense strategy<\/a>, I argue that Iran\u2019s leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel\u2019s advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Challenging Israel\u2019s advance<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel\u2019s successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world\u2019s most capable guerrilla fighting force \u2013 one that <a href=\"https:\/\/hds.sndu.ac.ir\/article_1683.html\">performed quite successfully<\/a> during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Nevertheless, Israel\u2019s ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah\u2019s top leaders \u2013 even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel\u2019s leaders <a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/air-force-chief-says-idf-ready-for-war-in-north-as-hamas-nears-defeat\/\">announced<\/a> their intention to engage Hezbollah \u2013 reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic\u2019s crown jewel within its \u201cAxis of Resistance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/lebanons-hezbollah-will-pick-new-leader-earliest-opportunity-says-its-deputy-2024-09-30\/\">appoint replacement leadership<\/a>, regroup and organize against Israel\u2019s ground invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>The brutal art of save face?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it\u2019s seen by other parts of its external proxy network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC \u2013 Tehran\u2019s primary arm for coordinating external operations \u2013 Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/article\/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad\">enabled and encouraged<\/a> the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel \u2013 even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel\u2019s military leaders to claim the group has been <a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/idf-assesses-hamas-defeated-military-in-all-of-gaza-is-now-a-guerrilla-terror-group\/\">effectively defeated<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran\u2019s enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/623164\/original\/file-20241002-16-1mv4i1.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" alt=\"A glow is seen above some buildings with bursts of lights from missiles scattered around.\"\/><figcaption>Rockets fired from Iran are seen over Jerusalem on Oct. 1, 2024. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/many-rockets-fired-from-iran-are-seen-over-jerusalem-from-news-photo\/2175288947?adppopup=true\">Wisam Hashlamoun\/Anadolu via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders \u2013 including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And second, Iran\u2019s proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them \u2013 or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Reclaiming deterrence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Perhaps above all, in Tehran\u2019s calculus over how to respond is Iran\u2019s need to restore a deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The two defining features of Iran\u2019s interrelated external, or \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/tc\/accept?origin=%2Fstable%2Fpdf%2Fresrep28480.5.pdf&amp;is_image=False\">forward defense<\/a>,\u201d and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/04\/12\/world\/middleeast\/iran-israel-military-weapons.html\">long-range weapons arsenal<\/a>, which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional U.S. allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran\u2019s enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran\u2019s proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran\u2019s hostile policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel\u2019s degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran\u2019s ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic\u2019s leaders, this is an unacceptable risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Who plays the next move?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran\u2019s leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on Oct. 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran\u2019s aims is unknown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/Detail\/2024\/10\/02\/734402\/Iran-defense-minister-Operation-True-Promise-II-successful-retaliatory-attack-Israel\">90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets<\/a>, while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/homenews\/administration\/4910108-white-house-iranian-missile-attack-escalation\/\">defeated and ineffective<\/a>,\u201d despite <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/MyLordBebo\/status\/1841183543093051731\">unverified cellphone videos<\/a> showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/world\/live-blog\/israel-hezbollah-live-updates-idf-ground-operation-lebanon-rcna173389\">vowed retaliation<\/a> against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>IRGC leaders met this warning with a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.isna.ir\/news\/1403071008450\/\">counterthreat of their own<\/a> that if Israel responds to the Oct. 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified \u201ccrushing and destructive attacks.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel\u2019s next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops \u2013 but make no mistake, it is a war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/aaron-pilkington-1364407\">Aaron Pilkington<\/a>, Fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-denver-812\">University of Denver<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This article is republished from <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\">The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/irans-strike-on-israel-was-retaliatory-but-it-was-also-about-saving-face-and-restoring-deterrence-240302\">original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Aaron Pilkington, University of Denver Israel and Iran are at war. In truth, the two sides have been fighting for decades, but the conflict has played out largely under the cover of covert and clandestine operations. The recent actions of both sides in this once \u201cshadow war\u201d have changed the nature of the conflict. It [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":37730,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[115,46,295,47,296,4],"tags":[14718,14691,2122,3666,885,891,886,860,15638],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37729"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37729"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37729\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37817,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37729\/revisions\/37817"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37730"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37729"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37729"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37729"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}