{"id":38531,"date":"2025-01-14T13:45:00","date_gmt":"2025-01-14T13:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=38531"},"modified":"2025-01-15T06:06:33","modified_gmt":"2025-01-15T06:06:33","slug":"4-reasons-why-the-us-might-want-to-buy-greenland-if-it-were-for-sale-which-it-isnt","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/4-reasons-why-the-us-might-want-to-buy-greenland-if-it-were-for-sale-which-it-isnt\/","title":{"rendered":"4 reasons why the US might want to buy Greenland \u2013 if it were for sale, which it isn\u2019t"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Scott L. Montgomery<\/a>, University of Washington<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

President-elect Donald Trump has sparked diplomatic controversy by suggesting<\/a> the U.S. needs to acquire Greenland for reasons of \u201cnational security\u201d and refusing to definitively rule out using military force to do so. Greenland, a self-governing Danish territory, \u201cis not for sale<\/a>,\u201d said Denmark\u2019s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trump\u2019s interest in Greenland is not new. He first expressed<\/a> interest in the territory in 2019, but it never developed into any action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether or not Trump has actual plans this time around to advance any attempt in Washington to own Greenland is far from clear. But given the incoming president\u2019s repeated statements<\/a> and invocation of national security, it\u2019s worth considering what strategic value Greenland might actually have from the perspective of the U.S.\u2019s geopolitical priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a scholar of geopolitical conflicts<\/a> involving natural resources and the Arctic, I believe Greenland\u2019s value from an international political perspective can be viewed in terms of four fundamental areas: minerals, military presence, Arctic geopolitics and the territory\u2019s potential independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A matter of minerals<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Greenland\u2019s most valuable natural resources lie with its vast mineral wealth, which holds real potential to advance its economy. Identified deposits include precious metals such as gold and platinum, a number of base metals \u2013 zinc, iron, copper, nickel, cobalt and uranium \u2013 and rare earth elements, including neodymium, dysprosium and praseodymium. A detailed 2023 summary<\/a> published by the Geologic Survey of Denmark and Greenland suggests new deposits will be found with the continued retreat of the Greenland Ice Sheet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Greenland\u2019s rare earth resources are particularly significant. These elements are essential not only to battery, solar and wind technology but also to military applications. If fully developed, the Kvanefjeld \u2013 or Kuannersuit in Greenlandic \u2013 uranium and rare earth deposit would place Greenland among the top producers worldwide<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the 2010s, Greenland\u2019s leaders encouraged interest from outside mining firms, including leading Chinese companies, before finally granting a lease to the Australian company Energy Transition Minerals (formerly Greenland Minerals Ltd).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When China\u2019s Shenghe Resources took a major share<\/a> in Energy Transition Minerals, it raised red flags for Denmark, the European Union and the U.S., which felt China was seeking to expand its global dominance of the rare earth market while reducing Europe\u2019s own potential supply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The issue was put to rest in 2021 when Greenland\u2019s parliament banned all uranium mining<\/a>, killing further development of Kvanefjeld for the time being. That same year saw the government also prohibit any further oil and gas activity<\/a>. Predictably, a majority of mining companies have subsequently steered clear<\/a> of Greenland due to perceived concern of any investment being jeopardized by future political decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fears of China abroad<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s interest in Greenland stretches back at least a decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2015, Greenland Minister of Finance and Interior Vittus Qujaukitsoq visited China to discuss possible investment<\/a> in mining, hydropower, port and other infrastructure projects. One firm<\/a>, China Communications Construction Company, bid to build two airports, one in the capital, Nuuk, the other in Ilulissat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another Chinese firm, General Nice Group, offered to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base<\/a> in northeastern Greenland, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences asked to build<\/a> a permanent research center and a satellite ground station near Nuuk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

None of this sat well<\/a> with the first Trump administration, which put pressure on Denmark to convince Greenland\u2019s government that a significant, official Chinese presence on the island was unwanted. The Danes and Greenlanders complied<\/a>, rebuffing Chinese attempts to invest in Greenland-based projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trump administration, in particular, viewed China\u2019s interest in Greenland as having hidden commercial and military motives<\/a>, concerns that continued under the Biden administration in its recent lobbying<\/a> of another Australian mining firm not to sell any of its Greenland assets to Chinese companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Long-standing US interest<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. has had a long-standing security interest in Greenland dating from 1946, when it offered Denmark US$100 million in gold bullion for it. The Danes politely but firmly declined, with their foreign minister saying<\/a> he didn\u2019t feel \u201cwe owe them the whole island.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the early 1950s, the U.S built Thule Air Force Base<\/a> 750 miles (about 1,200 kilometers) north of the Arctic Circle. Originally a missile early warning and radio communications site, it was transferred to the newly formed U.S. Space Force in 2020 and renamed Pituffik Space Base<\/a> in 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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