{"id":42256,"date":"2026-04-15T07:15:00","date_gmt":"2026-04-15T14:15:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=42256"},"modified":"2026-04-14T22:16:40","modified_gmt":"2026-04-15T05:16:40","slug":"strait-of-hormuz-why-the-us-and-iran-are-sailing-in-very-different-legal-waters","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/strait-of-hormuz-why-the-us-and-iran-are-sailing-in-very-different-legal-waters\/","title":{"rendered":"Strait of Hormuz: Why the US and Iran are sailing in very different legal&nbsp;waters"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/elizabeth-mendenhall-1112432\">Elizabeth Mendenhall<\/a>, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-rhode-island-921\">University of Rhode Island<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Strait of Hormuz exists in the eye of the beholder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While everyone agrees that, geographically speaking, it is a strait \u2013 a narrow sea passage connecting two places that ships want to go \u2013 its political and legal status is rather more complicated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The United States and Iran both eye the strait \u2013 a choke point through which <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c78n6p09pzno\">20% of the world\u2019s oil passes<\/a> \u2013 very differently. Washington sees the Strait of Hormuz as exclusively an international waterway, whereas Tehran sees it as part of it territorial waters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It follows that Iran\u2019s toll-charging of ships is seen by the U.S. as illegal. Similarly, U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s blockade of the passage is a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbs19news.com\/iran-slams-us-blockade-as-grave-violation-of-sovereignty\/article_c6f41a4e-5533-5f82-a45c-bed2a88f4598.html\">grave violation\u201d of sovereignty<\/a> to Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.elizabeth-mendenhall.com\/\">expert in the law of the sea<\/a>, I know part of the problem is that the U.S. and Iran are living in two different worlds when it comes to the international laws governing the strait. Further complicating matters, both are in a different legal universe than most of the rest of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>The law of the sea<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The \u201claw of the sea\u201d is a network of international laws, customs and agreements that set out the foundation for rights of access and control in the ocean. The framework sits apart from the laws of warfare, which are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ejiltalk.org\/the-legality-of-irans-closure-of-the-strait-of-hormuz\/\">also relevant to the Persian Gulf situation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/depts\/los\/convention_agreements\/texts\/unclos\/unclos_e.pdf\">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea<\/a>, or UNCLOS, is a major plank of the law of the sea. Completed in 1982 and in force since 1994, it aims to create a stable set of zones and places \u2013 like international straits \u2013 where everyone agrees on who can do what. It has been <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/depts\/los\/reference_files\/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm\">ratified by 171 countries and the European Union<\/a>, but not Iran or the United States. Iran has signed it but has yet to ratify; the U.S. has done neither.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This means that the rules which almost <a href=\"https:\/\/treaties.un.org\/pages\/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXI-6&amp;chapter=21&amp;Temp=mtdsg3&amp;clang=_en\">every country in the world has consented to<\/a> can\u2019t serve as a basis of agreement over how the U.S. and Iran should govern their actions in the strait during the current war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>The view from Iran<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Both Iran and the U.S. agree that under the law of the sea, the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, but not on what kind of international strait it is. Moreover, they disagree on the relevant laws that exist, and how they apply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait as set out under international law predating UNCLOS \u2013 notably the International Court of Justice\u2019s ruling in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icj-cij.org\/case\/1\">1949 Corfu Channel case<\/a> and the <a href=\"https:\/\/treaties.un.org\/doc\/Treaties\/1964\/11\/19641122%2002-14%20AM\/Ch_XXI_01_2_3_4_5p.pdf\">1958 Territorial Seas Convention<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These older standards state that foreign ships have a right of \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/treaties.un.org\/doc\/Treaties\/1964\/11\/19641122%2002-14%20AM\/Ch_XXI_01_2_3_4_5p.pdf\">innocent passage<\/a>\u201d through international straits. Put in other terms, this means that if a ship is simply passing through, without doing anything else and without harming the security of the coastal countries, it must be allowed passage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This gives Iran \u2013 and Oman, the strait\u2019s other bordering country \u2013 power to make and enforce some rules over passage, such as rules for safety and the environment. They also have wide discretion to decide if passage is \u201cnon-innocent\u201d and therefore not allowed. But it does not give them the right to impede innocent passage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Contrary to the older standard, however, Tehran claims the right to \u201csuspend\u201d passage through its half of the strait, citing the waters as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/depts\/los\/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES\/PDFFILES\/IRN_1993_Act.pdf\">its territorial sea<\/a>. This is a violation of the 1958 Territorial Seas Convention that Iran relies on for legal support, which says that when a territorial sea is also an international strait, innocent passage cannot be suspended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>The US interpretation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>For the U.S., the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait requiring \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/depts\/los\/convention_agreements\/texts\/unclos\/part3.htm\">transit passage<\/a>,\u201d as per UNCLOS. Although the United States is not a member of UNCLOS, it argues that the agreement\u2019s updated concept of an \u201cinternational strait\u201d should apply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Understanding a waterway as the newer type of \u201cinternational strait,\u201d which requires transit passage, shifts the balance against a coastal country\u2019s control and toward free navigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Under this standard, countries bordering straits \u2013 like Iran and Oman in the case of Hormuz \u2013 must also allow overflight and submarines below the surface. Passage must be allowed so long as it is \u201ccontinuous and expeditious.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The U.S. has forcefully asserted this position at sea through regular \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/policy.war.gov\/FON\/\">Freedom of Navigation<\/a>\u201d patrols through the Strait of Hormuz and other straits around the world. The patrols are a visible rejection of claims over the ocean that the U.S. deems illegal or excessive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The basic U.S. argument is supported by some leading legal scholars, such as James Kraska, a professor of international maritime law at the U.S. Naval War College, who <a href=\"https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/maritime-power-and-the-law-of-the-sea-9780199773381\">decries the Iranian position<\/a> as \u201clawfare\u201d and argues that Iran must <a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472065\">abide by the compromises made in UNCLOS<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>A \u2018persistent objector\u2019<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>But the U.S. is a global outlier here, and one of only a handful of countries \u2013 alongside the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Thailand and Papua New Guinea \u2013 which argue that \u201ctransit passage\u201d is required by custom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Custom, in this sense, is established if a practice at sea is seen as consistent and is backed by wide agreement over its legality. If something is seen as customary law, it applies to everyone. The only way to prevent a custom from applying to you is <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/oxford-law-pro\/book\/57170\">through the \u201cpersistent objection rule<\/a>,\u201d which gives a country an exemption to newly emerging standards if it has shown itself to be consistently against it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Legal scholars <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2026\/04\/strait-hormuz-shipping-and-law\">are split<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/books.google.com\/books\/about\/The_Law_of_the_Sea.html?id=io-PWhD2B3EC\">on whether transit passage<\/a> is customary law \u2013 although law of the sea specialists tend to say it is not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tehran argues that even if transit passage were customary international law, Iran is a \u201cpersistent objector,\u201d and therefore, the <a href=\"https:\/\/digital-commons.usnwc.edu\/ils\/vol106\/iss1\/15\/\">rule doesn\u2019t apply to them<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And it is true that Iran\u2019s objection has been consistent. Both Iran and Oman argued in favor of innocent passage, and against transit passage, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/books\/edition\/The_Middle_Eastern_States_and_the_Law_of\/sn67AAAAIAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=El-Hakim+middle+eastern+states+and+law+of+the+sea&amp;printsec=frontcover\">at the UNCLOS negotiations<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Iran reaffirmed its perspective <a href=\"https:\/\/treaties.un.org\/Pages\/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXI-6&amp;chapter=21&amp;Temp=mtdsg3&amp;clang=_en#EndDec\">upon signing UNCLOS<\/a> in 1982. Tehran argues that because transit passage is tied up in the compromises made by UNCLOS, only countries that ratify the treaty can claim the right to transit passage \u2013 and neither the U.S. nor Iran has ratified it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/729987\/original\/file-20260414-57-u60d8s.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" alt=\"A graphic shows a map with warships.\" \/><figcaption>U.S. warships float around the Strait of Hormuz. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/an-infographic-titled-us-warships-around-the-strait-of-news-photo\/2270840884?adppopup=true\">Yasin Demirci\/Anadolu via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2>Navigating troubled waters<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The complex military situation and economic disruption are only part of the story of the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What lies beneath is a complicated legal situation. Not only do the U.S. and Iran disagree about the legal status of the strait, but the countries that flag oil tankers \u2013 and which are therefore responsible for them \u2013 must also navigate their own commitments and perspectives under the law of the sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Every nation wants to avoid a legal precedent that is contrary to its long-term interests. But for international law to function \u2013 to reduce conflict and enable trade \u2013 what is needed is an agreement about what rules exist, and a shared commitment to abide by them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Only that would achieve a stable post-war status for the Strait of Hormuz. How we get there, however, requires navigating some very tricky waters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/elizabeth-mendenhall-1112432\">Elizabeth Mendenhall<\/a>, Associate Professor of Marine Affairs, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-rhode-island-921\">University of Rhode Island<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This article is republished from <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\">The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/strait-of-hormuz-why-the-us-and-iran-are-sailing-in-very-different-legal-waters-280557\">original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Elizabeth Mendenhall, University of Rhode Island The Strait of Hormuz exists in the eye of the beholder. While everyone agrees that, geographically speaking, it is a strait \u2013 a narrow sea passage connecting two places that ships want to go \u2013 its political and legal status is rather more complicated. The United States and Iran [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":56,"featured_media":42257,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[5,276,46,295,25,296,4],"tags":[17654,479,2122,885,891,886,860,4338,17506,17655,1602,6904,2872,7518,6835],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42256"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/56"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42256"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42256\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":42258,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42256\/revisions\/42258"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/42257"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42256"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=42256"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=42256"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}