{"id":42720,"date":"2026-06-28T07:15:00","date_gmt":"2026-06-28T14:15:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/?p=42720"},"modified":"2026-06-28T22:15:28","modified_gmt":"2026-06-29T05:15:28","slug":"israels-campaign-between-the-wars-how-strategy-to-contain-iran-and-its-allies-risks-further-straining-ties-with-us","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/israels-campaign-between-the-wars-how-strategy-to-contain-iran-and-its-allies-risks-further-straining-ties-with-us\/","title":{"rendered":"Israel\u2019s \u2018campaign between the wars\u2019: How strategy to contain Iran and its allies risks further straining ties with&nbsp;US"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/amy-mcauliffe-2545962\">Amy McAuliffe<\/a>, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-notre-dame-990\">University of Notre Dame<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A lot hangs on whether the United States can compel Israel to cease operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. After all, an end to the Israeli military offensive was a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/14-point-draft-us-iran-deal-2026-06-17\/\">key provision of the broad U.S.-Iran agreement<\/a> setting out a road map to end the Iran war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And even though Israel did not sign the deal, policymakers in Washington will continue to press Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to abide by the truce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Yet there\u2019s a larger and more vexing issue for the Trump administration and its Arab allies in the Middle East that has received little attention: Israel\u2019s long-standing \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/mwi.westpoint.edu\/israels-campaign-between-the-wars-lessons-for-the-united-states\/\">campaign between the wars\u201d strategy<\/a> and whether it threatens the prospect for long-term peace in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The policy, known as \u201cMivtsa Bein Milchamot\u201d in Hebrew and shortened to \u201cMabam,\u201d has become a widely accepted facet of Israel\u2019s national security. Its purpose is to degrade the capabilities of Iran and its key regional allies in any interwar period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As the <a href=\"https:\/\/keough.nd.edu\/about\/faculty-staff-directory\/amy-mcauliffe\/\">former assistant director of CIA for Weapons and Counterproliferation<\/a>, I have watched Israel wage Mabam in an increasingly bold manner and widening geographic scope over the past seven years. Israel has broadened both the targets of the strategy and the instruments it uses to strike them, heightening the risk of escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Save any unexpected abandonment of the policy, Israel will almost certainly continue launching limited military strikes, covert action and cyberattacks across the Middle East, regardless of any U.S. deal with Iran. This will likely take the form of degrading the capabilities of Iran\u2019s partner Hezbollah, Iranian-backed Shiite militants in Iraq and even Tehran\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-danger-of-calling-the-houthis-an-iranian-proxy\/\">unreliable ally the Houthis in Yemen<\/a>. And Israel will remain willing to take military actions short of full-scale war in Iran itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But such outcomes will pose serious challenges for the U.S., which seems intent on avoiding a renewed war with Tehran. In fact, Israel\u2019s \u201ccampaign between the wars\u201d risks widening the split with Washington and restarting war with Iran and its allies over the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>Origins of Mabam<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel codified the Mabam strategy in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/new-idf-strategy-goes-public\">a 2015 Israeli Defense Forces document<\/a>. Its history, however, predates the official adoption of the policy, with the IDF executing \u201ccampaign between the wars\u201d operations in the early 2010s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Most scholars and Israeli military officials acknowledge that the strategy evolved from cross-border \u201creprisal operations\u201d against Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/strategic_assessment\/the-fly-on-the-elephants-back-the-campaign-between-wars-in-israels-security-doctrinee\/\">in the 1950s and \u201960s<\/a> .<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The logic behind Mabam is that by using targeted operations to consistently downgrade the capabilities of Iran and its allies, Israel will be better prepared for future wars by maintaining a qualitative military advantage. Israel\u2019s goal is to avoid escalation by taking actions that it judges Iran and its proxies will view as below the threshold for significant retaliation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As the former chief of the Israeli general staff and architect of Mabam, Lt. Gen Gadi Eisenkot, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/campaign-between-wars-how-israel-rethought-its-strategy-counter-irans-malign\">explained in 2019<\/a>: \u201cDeviating from the binary approach of either preparing for war or openly waging it, the [campaign between the wars policy] strives for proactive, offensive actions based on extremely high-quality intelligence and clandestine efforts.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/744277\/original\/file-20260625-71-9isz17.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" alt=\"Two men, one in army garb, stand at a lecturn.\" \/><figcaption>Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot at a press conference in Tel Aviv on Dec. 4, 2018. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-and-israeli-chief-news-photo\/1068413686?adppopup=true\">Jack Guez\/AFP via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2>Expanding beyond Syria<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In the early 2010s, the Israeli military focused Mabam on Hezbollah in Syria, where the group lacked the advanced military capabilities it possessed in Lebanon and therefore posed a less significant risk of escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Jerusalem placed a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/strategic_assessment\/the-fly-on-the-elephants-back-the-campaign-between-wars-in-israels-security-doctrinee\/\">premium on degrading Hezbollah\u2019s<\/a> advanced weapons, supplied by its ally and sponsor Iran, and \u201cpreventing the entrenchment of terror infrastructures on the Golan Heights border,\u201d in the words of Israeli military strategist Eran Ortal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To achieve this, Israel employed airstrikes, cyberattacks, interdictions of weapons and covert action to impede Iran\u2019s ability to resupply Hezbollah\u2019s existing arsenal and supply it with more advanced weapons. Israel\u2019s targets included Iranian facilities and missile warehouses in Syria, convoys and shipments of weapons, and Hezbollah and Islamic Revolutionary Guard personnel in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Later in the decade, Israel broadened its objectives to include pressuring the Assad regime in Syria and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/publication\/war-between-the-wars-syria\/\">undercutting the long-standing Iranian-Syrian relationship<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Encouraged by the success of its strategy in Syria, Israel began to take action against Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Lebanon as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In summer 2019, Israel reportedly struck the weapons depots of Iranian-back Shiite militant groups in Iraq. Explosive-laden drones that experts trace to Israel targeted equipment <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/publication\/the-campaign-between-wars-faster-higher-fiercer\/\">linked to Hezbollah\u2019s precision-guided missile program<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With these actions, Israel almost certainly delayed and degraded some adversary capabilities, especially those of Hezbollah. In particular, it stopped or delayed Iranian transfers of precision-guided missiles and the guidance kits that Hezbollah could use to enable such capability, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.israelhayom.com\/2021\/02\/25\/israels-red-line-1000-precision-missiles-in-hezbollahs-hands\/\">limiting the size of the Lebanese group\u2019s arsenal<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img src=\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/744273\/original\/file-20260625-57-wnwbz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip\" alt=\"Men in fatigues salute a large banner.\" \/><figcaption>Hezbollah fighters salute a banner in a mountainous area around the Lebanese-Syrian border town of Arsal on July 26, 2017. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gettyimages.com\/detail\/news-photo\/fighters-from-the-lebanese-shiite-hezbollah-movement-raise-news-photo\/823048652?adppopup=true\">Anwar Amro\/AFP via Getty Images<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2>An imperfect strategy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>However, the size and capabilities of Hezbollah\u2019s missile and rocket force show the limits of Israeli effectiveness. The group possessed an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis%20\/coming-conflict-hezbollah\">prior to the resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in 2026<\/a>. Israeli officials and pro-Israeli think tanks would make the counterfactual argument that Hezbollah\u2019s arsenal, especially of advanced weapons, would have been much larger without Mabam operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israeli officials refrain from directly connecting the country\u2019s covert action in Iran since the late 2010s to Mabam. But explosions at nuclear, missile and drone facilities and assassinations of scientists outside the direct conflicts of June 2025 and from February 2026 clearly map to the goal of degrading Iranian military capabilities in between wars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To use one prominent example, an explosion in July 2020 widely linked to Israel disabled a key Iranian advanced centrifuge assembly facility, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fdd.org\/analysis\/2022\/04\/12\/irans-centrifuge-manufacturing-goes-underground\/\">destroying more than half of the facility<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But the attack had unexpected consequences. Iran was able to rebuild the capability in a matter of months, concentrating on locating future centrifuge assembly capabilities <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fdd.org\/analysis\/2022\/04\/12\/irans-centrifuge-manufacturing-goes-underground\/\">at sites buried deep underground<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2>A risk to US objectives<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In an early 2026 graduation speech for military cadets, Netanyahu declared that Israel <a href=\"https:\/\/www.timesofisrael.com\/liveblog_entry\/netanyahu-there-is-no-more-containment-of-threats-if-you-dont-come-to-the-jungle-the-jungle-comes-to-you\/\">would move beyond Mabam<\/a> to even more actively confront threats. \u201cThere is no more containment of threats. There is no more Mabam,\u201d he said after decades of supporting the strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But even a force that conducts a high number of military operations like the IDF needs a strategy short of full-scale war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And since most in the Israeli security establishment view the Mabam strategy as generally successful in diminishing Iran\u2019s capabilities and those of its partners and proxies, it will likely remain a prominent feature of Israeli strategy even <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/publication\/culminating-point-success-risk-overload-campaign-wars-syria\/\">if updated to reflect current perceived threats<\/a>. This will be the case whether Israel is led by Netanyahu or another leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/publication\/the-campaign-between-wars-faster-higher-fiercer\/\">central aspect of Mabam is avoiding escalation<\/a>, this balancing act will be increasingly difficult in today\u2019s Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To retain U.S. support for Israel\u2019s overall Iran strategy, expanded coordination with Washington will be crucial. Israel has sometimes, but not always, coordinated relevant actions with the U.S. For instance, it allowed the U.S. Central Command to review strikes it planned to launch from <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jpost.com\/middle-east\/article-709709\">near the Al Tanf Base in Syria that hosted U.S. troops<\/a> until February 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Israel believes it has valid reasons for sometimes conducting military action on its own: Israeli officials view Iran developing a nuclear weapon <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iranintl.com\/en\/202509260985\">as an \u201cexistential\u201d threat<\/a> and Hezbollah having a large arsenal of precision-guided missiles <a href=\"https:\/\/www.israelhayom.com\/2021\/02\/25\/israels-red-line-1000-precision-missiles-in-hezbollahs-hands\/\">as a \u201cstrategic threat<\/a>\u201d to the state of Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>However, Washington is likely to ask for wider coordination with Israel in the aftermath of the Iran war. That war ever more tightly connected U.S. security interests to those of Israel, but the ongoing negotiations to end the conflict have shown a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/news\/iran-war-trump-netanyahu-us-israel-united-then-divided\/\">rare degree of distance between the two countries<\/a>. Coordinating its operations short of war will be a bitter pill for Israeli leaders intent on acting as they desire. It also has the potential to further strain Israel-U.S. relations in the years ahead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/profiles\/amy-mcauliffe-2545962\">Amy McAuliffe<\/a>, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/institutions\/university-of-notre-dame-990\">University of Notre Dame<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This article is republished from <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\">The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/israels-campaign-between-the-wars-how-strategy-to-contain-iran-and-its-allies-risks-further-straining-ties-with-us-284697\">original article<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Amy McAuliffe, University of Notre Dame A lot hangs on whether the United States can compel Israel to cease operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. After all, an end to the Israeli military offensive was a key provision of the broad U.S.-Iran agreement setting out a road map to end the Iran war. And even though [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":56,"featured_media":42721,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[8025,46,295,10,47,296,36,4,38,9],"tags":[7481,17595,16530,3666,14719,15637,17885,15585,885,891,886,860,371,7518,7512,16576],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42720"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/56"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42720"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42720\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":42722,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42720\/revisions\/42722"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/42721"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42720"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=42720"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.lifeandnews.com\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=42720"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}